Abstract-Recently, there has been renewed interest in basing cryptographic primitives on weak secrets, where the only information about the secret is some non-trivial amount of (min-) entropy. From a formal point of view, such results require to upper bound the expectation of some function f (X), where X is a weak source in question. We show an elementary inequality which essentially upper bounds such 'weak expectation' by two terms, the first of which is independent of f , while the second only depends on the 'variance' of f under uniform distribution. Quite remarkably, as relatively simple corollaries of this elementary inequality, we obtain some 'unexpected' results, in several cases noticeably simplifying/improving prior techniques for the same problem. Examples include non-malleable extractors, leakageresilient symmetric encryption, seed-dependent condensers and improved entropy loss for the leftover hash lemma.
I. INTRODUCTION
Formal cryptographic models take for granted the availability of perfect randomness. However, in reality we may only obtain 'weak' random sources that are far from uniform but only guaranteed with high unpredictability (formalized with minentropy), such as biometric data [1] , [2] , physical sources [3] , [4] , secrets with partial leakage, and group elements from Diffie-Hellman key exchange [5] , [6] . We refer to the former as ideal model and the latter as real model.
From a formal point of view, the standard (T, ε)-security (in the ideal model) of a cryptographic application P essentially requires that for any adversary A with resource 1 T , the expectation of f (U m ) is upper bounded by ε, where function f (r) denotes A's advantage conditioned on secret key being r, and U m denotes uniform distribution over {0, 1} m . In the real model, keys are sampled from some non-uniform distribution R and thus the resulting security is the expected value of f (R), which we call 'weak expectation'. We would hope that if P is (T, ε)-secure in the ideal setting, then P is also (T , ε ) in the real setting by replacing U m with R of sufficiently high min-entropy, where T and ε are not much worse than T and ε respectively.
In this paper, we present an elementary inequality that upper bounds the weak expectation of f (R) by two terms: the first term only depends on the entropy deficiency (i.e. the difference between the length of source R and the amount of entropy it has), and the second is essentially the 'variance' of f under uniform distribution U m . Quite surprisingly, some 'unexpected' results follow as simple corollaries of this inequality, such as non-malleable extractors [7] , [8] , [9] , [10] , leakage-resilient symmetric encryptions [11] , seed-dependent condensers [12] and improved entropy loss for the leftover hash lemma [13] . We provide a unified proof for these diversified problems and in many cases significantly simply and/or improve known techniques for the same problems.
II. PRELIMINARIES
NOTATIONS AND DEFINITIONS. We use s ← S to denote sampling an element s according to distribution S. The minentropy of a random variable X is defined as
. We use Col(X) to denote the collision probability of X, i.e., Col(X)
2 ≤ 2 −H∞(X) , and collision entropy H 2 (X)
We also define average (aka conditional) collision entropy and average min-entropy of a random variable X conditioned on another random variable Z by
respectively, where E z←Z denotes the expected value over z ← Z.
We denote with ∆ D (X, Y ) the advantage of a circuit D in distinguishing the random variables X, Y :
we write SD(X, Y |Z) as shorthand for SD((X, Z), (Y, Z)).
ABSTRACT SECURITY GAMES. We first define the general type of applications where our technique applies. The security of an application P can be defined via an interactive game between a probabilistic attacker A and a probabilistic challenger C(r), where A and C jointly compute function f on value r (derived from U m in the ideal setting and from distribution R in the real setting). The game can have an arbitrary structure, but at the end C(r) should output a bit, with output 1 indicating that A 'won' the game and 0 otherwise. For unpredictability games, f (r) is the expected value of C(r) taken over the internal coins of A and C so that f (r) ∈ [0; 1];
and for indistinguishability games, f (r) is the expectation of C(r) − 1/2, and hence f (r) 
Proof:
The above only applies to all "unpredictability" applications such as one-way functions, MACs and digital signatures.
INDISTINGUISHABILITY APPLICATIONS.
Unfortunately, Corollary 3.1 critically depends on the non-negativity of f , and is generally false when f can be negative, which happens for indistinguishability applications. In fact, for certain indistinguishability applications, such as one-time pad, pseudorandom-generators and functions (PRGs and PRFs), there exists R with d = 1 such that E[f (U m )] is negligible (or even zero!) but E[f (R)] = 1/2 (see [13] for more discussions). Fortunately, below we give another inequality for general f , which will be useful for other indistinguishability applications.
Lemma 3.2: For any (deterministic) real-valued function f : {0, 1} m → R and any random variable R with
Proof: Denote p(r) = Pr[R = r], and also recall the Cauchy-Schwartz inequality 2 ], for which we define the notion of "square security". Lemma 3.2 essentially applies to square secure applications, which we state as Corollary 3.2.
Definition 3.1 (Square Security): An application P is (T, σ)-square secure if for any T -bounded adversary A we
2 ] ≤ σ, where f (r) denotes A's advantage conditioned on key being r.
Corollary 3.2 (Square security implies real model security):
Hence, we immediately get
Moving to indistinguishability applications, it is known that PRGs, PRFs, one-time pads cannot have good square security (see [13] ). To see why, consider a 1-bit one time pad encryption c = m ⊕ r, where m, r, c ∈ {0, 1} are the message, the key and the ciphertext, respectively, and ⊕ is "exclusive OR". Consider also the attacker A who guesses that m = c. When the key r = 0, A is right and f (0) = 1 − 
. Fortunately, there are still many interesting indistinguishability objects whose square security is of roughly the same order as their regular security, such as stateless CPA-and CCAsecure (symmetric-key and public-key) encryption schemes, weak pseudo-random functions (weak PRFs), and q-wise independent hash functions. We now discuss some examples.
A. Application to Encryption Schemes and Weak PRFs
We will only show that CPA-secure symmetric-key encryption schemes are square secure, and we prove that using the "double-run" technique from [13] . Other schemes (mentioned above) can be proven similarly by adapting the double-run trick to the actual security game (see [13] for the subtleties).
Lemma 3.3 ( [13] ): Assume P is a symmetric-key encryption scheme which is 2ε-secure, in the ideal model, against all chosen-plaintext attackers with running time 2t + O(1) and making 2q + 1 queries. Then P is ε-square secure against all chosen-plaintext attackers with running time t, and makingueries. Hence, (T = (2t + O(1), 2q + 1), 2ε)-security implies ((t, q), ε)-security.
DOUBLE-RUN TRICK. We sketch the proof of the above lemma for completeness. It suffices to show that for any r and any attacker A with running time t andueries, there exists another attacker B with running time roughly 2t and 2q + 1 queries such that B's advantage is twice the squared advantage of A. The strategy of B is that it first simulates the challenger C (using one query), runs A against the simulated C, and then runs A against the real C. If A wins the game in its first run (against the simulated C), then B returns A's answer in the second run, or otherwise B reverses the answer of A. Thus,
The following theorem immediately follows from Corollary 3.2 and Lemma 3.3.
Theorem 3.1: Assume P is a ((2t + O(1), 2q), 2ε)-CPA secure symmetric-key encryption scheme in the ideal model. Then P is also ((t, q),
Same argument (as Theorem 3.1) works for all aforementioned square secure applications, such as stateless (publickey and symmetric-key) CPA-and CCA-secure encryption schemes, and weak PRFs, simplifying [11] .
MULTI-RUN EXTENSION. In the double-run game we use a test-run to estimate the sign of the advantage (whether it's positive or not), which advises attacker B whether or not to reverse A's answer in the real run. We can generalize this to a multi-run setting: the attacker B test-runs A for some odd (2i+1) times, and takes a majority vote before the actual run, which gives B more accurate estimate on the sign of the advantage (using the technique of Brakerski and Goldreich [14] ). This applies to all double-run-friendly applications (like the CPA encryption), but we only state it for the case of weak PRF for concreteness, and also because it simplifies [11] a lot. 
B. Application to Alternative LHL and NM-Extractors
We now show that 2-wise and 4-wise independent hash functions give rise to strong and non-malleable extractors respectively. For our convenience, we use the following definition for (q, δ)-wise independence (slightly weaker than the traditional q-wise independence), where one point s is randomly chosen and the rest q − 1 points can be arbitrarily dependent on s (as long as they are distinct from s).
Definition 3.2 ((q,δ)-wise independence):
A family H of functions {h r : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} l | r ∈ {0, 1} m } is (q, δ)-wise independent, if for r←U m , s ← U n , and for s 1 , · · · , s q−1 ∈ {0, 1} n that are distinct from and arbitrarily correlated to s, we have
Notice, we can naturally view the above definition as a game between a challenger C and the attacker A, where (q − 1) measures the "resources" of A (distinct from s points where he learns the true value of h r ), and δ is the advantage of distinguishing h r (s) from random. Thus, we can naturally define the (q, σ q )-square security of H (with random key r ← U m ) and then use Corollary 3.2 to bound the security of H in the (m − d)-real 2 model, when using a weak key R with H 2 (R) ≥ m−d. In fact, we can successfully apply the doublerun trick above to show that if H is (2q, δ)-wise independent, then its square security σ q as a q-wise (rather than 2q-wise) independent hash function is at most σ q ≤ δ + q 2 n , where q 2 n accounts for the probability that the real challenge point (chosen uniformly at random) collides with the q points of the test-run. Applying now Corollary 3.2, we get Theorem 3.2: If function family H is (2q, δ)-wise independent, then H is also (q, ε)-wise independent in the (m − d)-real 2 model, where ε = (δ + q 2 n ) · 2 d . ALTERNATIVE LHL. We will first consider the consequences for q = 1, where the notion of (1, ε)-wise independence in the k = (m − d)-real 2 model becomes a randomness extractor. Definition 3.3 (Extractors): We say that an efficient func-
m ) with H 2 (R) ≥ k and for random S (uniform over {0, 1} n ), we get
where coins S ← U n is the random seed of Ext. The value L = k − l is called the entropy loss of Ext. Applying Theorem 3.2 to pairwise independent hash functions (i.e., 2q = 2, δ = 0, k = m − d), we get:
To compare this result with the standard LHL [15] , the optimal key length m for a family of pairwise independent hash functions from n to l bits is known to be m = n + l (e.g., using Toeplitz matrices or "augmented" inner product discussed below). Plugging this to our bound in ε above, we get the same bound ε = √ 2 l−k = 2 −L/2 as the leftover hash lemma, where in both cases l is output size and k is the entropy of the source. Interestingly, standard leftover hashing [15] uses universal H (see Definition 4.3 below), which is weaker, but sets Ext(r; s) = h s (r), swapping the roles of source and seed. m × {0, 1} n → {0, 1} l is a (k, ε)-non-malleable extractor, if for all R (over {0, 1} m ) with H 2 (R) ≥ k, for random S (uniform over {0, 1} n ), and for all functions g : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n , s.t. g(s) = s for all s, we get SD( nmExt(R; S) , U l | S, nmExt(R; g(S)) ) ≤ ε Applying Theorem 3.2 to 4-wise independent hash functions (i.e., 2q = 4, δ = 0, k = m − d), we get:
For a simple instantiation, let H be the following (optimal) 4-wise independent hash function with known parameters n = m/2 and l = m/4 (using BCH codes; see [10] ). The key r ∈ {0, 1} m is viewed as a tuple of 4 elements (r 1 , r 2 , r 3 , r 4 )
, and a seed s ∈ {0, 1} n \0 n is viewed as a non-zero point in GF [2 n ]. Then, the m-bit value of (s s
, and the l-bit output of the function is set to h r (s) = r 1 ·s 1 +. . .+r 4 ·s 4 . Using Corollary 3.5, this simple function is a (k, √ 2 m/2−k+1 )-non-malleable extractor, which improves the construction of [8] and matches the recent results of [10] with a much simplified proof.
IV. KEY DERIVATION FUNCTIONS
So far we use weak sources directly on ε-square secure objects (and we still get extractors), which requires entropy deficiency d < log (1/ε). For low entropy sources where d log (1/ε), we need to apply a key derivation function (KDF) that preprocess the source to get some better randomness (by discarding some 'bad' bits), where the setting is mainly characterized by the entropy of the source k and the output size of the KDF m.
Definition 4.1: (k, m)-real c model (for c ∈ {2, ∞}) refers to the key derivation setting where a given KDF h with range {0, 1} m is applied to any source X with H c (X) ≥ k to get a secret key R = h(X) (for some application in question).
Next we propose randomness condensers as generalization of extractors, and justify the use of condensers as key derivation functions. Intuitively, a condenser is a probabilistic function that reduces entropy deficiency. Definition 4.2 (Condensers): Let c ∈ {2, ∞}. We say that an efficient function Cond :
Both H ∞ -and H 2 -condensers are useful in cryptography. The former connects well with Lemma 3.1, and the latter is more in line with Lemma 3.2. In the sequel, though, we will only use H 2 (and let c = 2 hereafter) since it seems to give stronger final bounds (even for unpredictability applications), and applies to more cases (e.g. indistinguishability applications). See [12] for more discussion.
A. Improved Leftover Hash Lemma
We know by the standard leftover hash lemma [15] that universal hash functions are efficient extractors and thus are good KDFs, but the entropy loss L (entropy of the source minus the length of extracted randomness) must be positive. Below we recall the notion of universal hashing [16] , and state their condensing properties. We show if they are used as KDFs for all "square-friendly" applications, 4 we improve L (reducing it by half) and make it meaningful even for L ≤ 0, where entropy deficiency d ≈ −L.
Definition 4.3 (Universal Hashing): A family of functions
n we have
, where
We use a slightly differently version of Lemma 3.2 (whose proof is very similar as well) for the improved entropy loss results. m → R and any random variable R with
Corollary 4.1 (Using Universal Hashing as KDF): If P is (T, ε)-secure and (T, σ)-square secure, then using R = g s (X) makes P (T, ε )-secure in the (k, m)-real 2 model, where R ∈ {0, 1} m , H 2 (X) ≥ k, and ε ≤ ε + √ σ·2 m−k .
REDUCED ENTROPY LOSS FOR LEFTOVER HASH LEMMA.
Recall that we can have σ ≈ ε for many square-secure applications. Let L = k −m denote entropy loss. To achieve ε ≈ ε we need to set L = log (1/ε), while the standard leftover hash lemma achieved a weaker bound ε ≤ ε+ √ 2 m−k , and required L = 2 log (1/ε). Moreover, our entropy loss is meaningful even for negative L, in which case entropy deficiency of
B. Seed-Dependent Key Derivation
We now generalize the notion of a condenser to the seeddependent setting, where the adversarial sampler A can depend on the seed S but is computationally bounded. This challenging setting was considered by [17] in the context of seeddependent extractors, where the authors made a pessimistic conclusion that the complexity of the seed-dependent extractor must be larger than that of the sampler A, making this notion not very useful for key derivation in practical applications. In contrast, we show that (strong enough) collision-resistant hash functions (CRHFs) must be seed-dependent condensers, and thus can be used as KDFs for all square secure applications, despite having much smaller complexity than the complexity of the sampler A. This partially explains the use of CRHFs as KDFs in practical applications.
Definition 4.4 (Seed-Dependent Condensers): An efficient function Cond : {0,
m , t) 2 -seed-dependent condenser if for all probabilistic adversaries A of size t who take a random seed s ← U v and output (using more coins) a sample X ← A(s) of entropy In the above, entropy deficiency d is essentially the logarithm of D(t), which is a function on the sampler's complexity t. We note D(t) = Ω(t 2 ) due to birthday attacks, and this bound can be achieved in the random oracle model. In general, it is reasonable to assume D(t) = poly(t) for strong enough CRHFs. Then, using the definition of condensers and Corollary 3.2, we get the following surprising result, which partially explains the prevalent use of CRHFs (which do not appear to have any extraction properties based on their definition) for key derivation:
Corollary 4.2 (Using CRHFs as KDFs): If P is (T, σ)-square secure, {g s } is a family of (2t, poly(t) 2 m )-CRHFs, and X is a source produced by a sampler A(s) of complexity at most t and having H 2 (X|S) ≥ k ≥ m − O(log t), then using R = g s (X) makes P (T, ε )-secure, where ε ≤ O( σ·poly(t)).
From an asymptotic point of view, for square-friendly applications (e.g. CPA-secure encryptions, weak PRFs, unpredictability primitives) with negligible ideal ε (and hence negligible σ ≈ ε), and all source samplers running in polynomial time t (all in the "security parameter"), we get negligible security ε =O( σ·poly(t)) in the real model.
